Afghanistan: Forming a Workable Government

Writing in Foreign Affairs, Stephen Biddle, Fotini Christia, and J Alexander Thier reject assumptions that a stable system of government cannot be achieved in Afghanistan, arguing that “Afghanistan’s own history offers ample evidence of the kind of stable, decentralized governance that could meet today’s demands without abandoning the country’s current constitution.” They argue that the Karzai government has struggled because it is based on the model of centralized democracy. According to their analysis, “decentralized democracy and internal mixed sovereignty are both feasible and acceptable” options that would also fulfill U.S. strategic interests by preventing terrorist elements from reemerging. On the first option, they propose a power-sharing deal wherein the central government would retain authority over internal security and foreign policy, but many other powers would reside with local democratic governments, pointing out that such a scheme would increase government legitimacy and public support. They describe the second option as a political setup wherein significant powers would still be afforded to local governments, who would not be required to exercise democracy and transparency, so long as they did not cross three “redlines”: violating the state’s foreign policy; infringing on the rights of neighboring districts; and engaging in large-scale theft, narcotics trafficking, or exploitation of the state’s natural resources. While claiming that this option “offers a closer fit with the realities of Afghanistan,” Biddle, Christia, and Thier acknowledge that it “also carries risks and disadvantages that make it less consistent with U.S. interests than either centralized or decentralized democracy,” including its potential to lead to regression on human rights, women’s rights, and corruption.