POMED Notes: “After the Elections: A New Beginning for Iraq and the United States?”

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a panel discussion with Saifaldin D. Abdul-Rahman, the former advisor to Iraqi Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi, Brian Katulis of the Center for American Progress, and Marina Ottaway, director of the Carnegie Middle East Program, to analyze the preliminary Iraqi election results and its implications on U.S. policy toward Iraq. Michele Dunne, a senior associate at Carnegie, moderated the conversation.

For POMED’s notes in PDF, click here. Otherwise, continue reading below.

Abdul-Rahman began his remarks by stating, “everyone’s forgotten about Iraq.” Proof, he said, is in the misstatements by the U.S. press. For instance, counter to conventional wisdom, the recent parliamentary elections have demonstrated that Iraq has not moved away from sectarianism. Though it has diminished, identity politics was still evident in the electoral breakdown of votes.

He explained that the close nature of the election results will make it very challenging to form a government (which requires a minimum of 163 out of 325 total seats), and will prove even more difficult to decide on a President. Upon forming a coalition, the leaders of the major parties – in particular, Ayad Allawi – will face the arduous task of reconciling campaign pledges with policy demands. Allawi, for example, will need to develop alliances with some of the Kurdish parties to put together a government but, in the process, will have to shed 20 members from his original list who ran on anti-Kurd agendas. Abdul Rahman asserted that “this is a recipe for a very long process.”

He also maintained that these elections were “not a watershed moment” but rather a “blip in a longer process.” The political parties and actors have not changed that much in recent years; the opposition parties will likely remain a major force; and the eventual government will likely consist of a weak coalition. He warned that such political instability may prove rife for outside actors, such as Iran, to influence the formation process. As a result, he does not see a different shift in policy toward the United States or a major shift in U.S.-Iraqi relations.

Marina Ottaway agreed that this was not a watershed election because there were not any new political actors. She also surmised that there would not be any great surprises in terms of the distribution of seats unless expatriate votes give some unanticipated help to Allawi’s cause. But “the most difficult part starts now,” as the parties jockey to form a coalition government. The irony about the process, she asserted, was that “the coalitions that are most represented are also the ones that will have most difficulty staying together and governing” because of the ensuing internal disagreements.

She also posited that a government led by Allawi will have a much easier time regaining a degree of respect for Iraq in neighboring Sunni countries, where “there is not much love for [current Prime Minister] Nouri al Maliki.” Allawi, she reminded the audience, travelled extensively to many Arab countries prior to the elections to ensure their support and to “bring Iraq back into the Arab fold.” Lastly, she did not think that the Iraqi government will at any point take an anti-Iranian position given the amount of Shiite leaders in Iraq and the relationship between the neighboring countries’ Shiite communities. “Iran will remain a player in that country,” she promised.

Brian Katulis reiterated that forming a government will be a complicated process replete with quite backroom politics. Nonetheless, he believed that this election demonstrated that “the Iraqis want their country back.” Though it will be tough for American leaders to let go, this is an important opportunity to salvage our operation in Iraq and correct mistakes made by the previous Administration. He described three recommendations for U.S. policy toward Iraq:

1)    The U.S. must live up to its commitments vis-à-vis the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA). If terms of those agreements need be renegotiated, they must arise from the Iraqis. Likewise, all security moves should be closely coordinated with Iraqi security forces

2)    The U.S. should quietly implement ‘smart power’ in Iraq through economic and diplomatic means. Increasing civilian support is fundamental to the U.S.-Iraqi relationship. 

3)    The U.S. needs to develop a more coherent regional strategy and determine Iraq’s role in that framework. Currently, we are too tactically focused. Moving forward, we all also must pursue aggressive multilateral diplomacy and “move to a place of offshore balancing.”

In response to a question about business prospects for American companies, Abdul-Rahman stated that the country has great economic potential despite the political instability and that “prospects for business will only continue to improve” as the political situation stabilizes. Katulis stated that “public-private partnerships is essential.” The complaint he hears most often is ‘why aren’t U.S. businesses investing more” in Iraq. The reasons, he maintained, are because of rampant corruption (dubbed “the second insurgency”) and a perception that there is great instability.

In response to a question about whether accusations of fraud should be taken seriously, Ottaway said that the greatest irregularity took place prior to the election with the banning of certain candidates because of alleged Baathist ties. And any violations that do exist, said Abdul-Rahman, will be slight enough so as not to have a marginal impact on the election results.

In his final remarks, Katulis reiterated that the United States “needs to deal with whomever wins.” He also argued that we need to focus on institution building and refrain from “our addiction to dictators.” Abdul-Rahman ended by stating that although “Maliki is not a shoe-in,” he is most likely to assume the position of Prime Minister. If he does not win, Abdul-Rahman expressed concern that it will be difficult to force him to step down. “Change is good for Iraqi institutions but bad for Iraqi stability.”