Afghanistan: Obama’s Speech and Reaction

President Obama delivered a speech yesterday at West Point that delineated his new strategy in Afghanistan, stipulating a troop surge of 30,000 soldiers that will begin to withdraw after 18 months.  The new strategy consists of three complementary efforts of the military, civilians, and a stronger partnership with Pakistan. President Obama narrowly defined the goal of the mission as destroying al-Qaeda, explaining that he refused to “set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests.”

In the final segment of the speech, President Obama broadened the scope to talk about American foreign policy more generally. He argued that our military, though important, is not sufficient our goals, and therefore the U.S. must use diplomacy “because no one nation can meet the challenges of an interconnected world acting alone.” Furthermore, he emphasized, “we must draw on the strength of our values [...] we must make it clear to every man, woman, and child around the world who lives under the dark cloud of tyranny that America will speak out on behalf of their human rights and tend to the light of freedom, and justice, and opportunity, and respect for the dignity of all peoples. That is who we are. That is the moral source of America’s authority.” While the President admitted he is most interested in nation-building the United States, he also contended that the lives of American children and grandchildren “will be better if other peoples’ children and grandchildren can live in freedom and access opportunity.”

In response to the speech, Michael Cohen calls the speech “a wonderful description of what a progressive foreign policy might look like.” However, he also is left wondering why the President did not provide more details of the strategy, a question also asked by Steve Clemons as well as Tim Fernholz. However, Spencer Ackerman at The Washington Independent fleshes out the strategy further. The U.S. troops will deploy largely in southern and eastern Afghanistan where the Pashtun insurgency is strongest, and they will focus their efforts on agricultural development, civilian security and sidestepping President Karzai when necessary to stem corruption. Meanwhile, Michael Tomasky at the Guardian reminds that “just because Obama didn’t say it in one speech doesn’t mean people in the administration aren’t thinking about it and drawing up specific plans.”

As Marc Ambinder details, President Obama has already begun divulging further details in a special lunch held for journalists. But the journalists left the lunch in disagreement over the new strategy. Thomas Friedman opposes the surge, not out of principle, but because the opportunity costs are too high. Meanwhile, David Ignatius applauds Obama’s decision to increase the troop level, but calls the timetable for withdrawal “the most dubious premise of his strategy.”

While Patrick Berry at Democracy Arsenal and Matthew Yglesias both contend a timeline is necessary to create leverage, many are excoriating President Obama for setting a date to begin a troop withdrawal. Among them, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) applauds the surge but criticizes the timeline, Sen. Kit Bond (R-Mo.) argues against the timetable, and Sen. Kay Hutchison (R.-Tex.) calls the timetable “the wrong message to send.”

Steven Metz explains the difficulty of finding a proper balance: “if the American commitment is too weak, the ally will cut a deal with the insurgents or simply collapse. If the American commitment is too strong, they ally will forego difficult reforms such as getting corruption under control.” The New York Times editorial therefore calls a deadline for withdrawal a “sound idea”  to pressure Karzai. They explain, “There is no chance of [success] unless Mr. Karzai ends the corruption and appoints competent officials. One of Mr. Obama’s biggest challenges is figuring out how to goad him into doing that, without further damaging the Afghan leader’s legitimacy, or driving him even deeper into his circle of unsavory cronies and warlords.” In a similar vein, Jean MacKenzie explores the rise and potential fall of Karzai, arguing that the “United States cannot abandon Karzai, and he cannot afford to kick them out.” Therefore, Mark Moyar suggests Washington can “compensate for Karzai’s failings by persuading him to make personnel changes and delegate greater authority to subordinates, especially Cabinet ministers.”

According to Kori Schake, President Obama “brushed lightly over election fraud in Afghanistan [sending] encouragement to despots that the president of the United States is legitimating  fraudulent elections.” And while Michael Crowley commends Obama for his intellectual consistency, he also observes that Obama “weirdly soft-peddled Karzai’s tainted legitimacy.” Gilles Dorronsoro contends the Afghan elections, designed to bolster the government’s legitimacy, had the opposite effect. Going forward, Karzai’s weakness will pose significant difficulties, especially in training the Afghan security forces. Michael O’Hanlon and Bruce Riedel predict that by the withdrawal initiation date, “we should know a great deal” if the strategy is working, especially in terms of training an effective, non-corrupt Afghan army and police. Meanwhile, Nick Mills argues that Karzai’s vulnerability doesn’t stem from the election’s shortcomings, but because he was elected at all in a country without any democratic tradition.

Garry Wills contends Afghanistan entails greater difficulties than Iraq because the corrupt and ineffectual government cannot control “tribal war, Islamic militancy, and warlordism.” Juan Cole also warns that the ”lucky” success of the Iraqi surge may not be easily replicated in Afghanistan and lays out 10 threats to President Obama’s new strategy.

Such analysis has led Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Cali.) to state, “I do not believe we should attempt to make Afghanistan into a Jeffersonian Democracy. We must respect the tribal culture and tradition of the country.” Similarly, Tim Rutten contends, “The United States will not remake Afghan society nor create a recognizable democracy there, nor will we emancipate the country’s wretchedly treated women.” Marc Lynch urges Obama to “make sure that he follows through on his promises to keep the goals tightly focused.” Steve Coll argues “Afghanistan’s most successful period of modern politics occurred [when] it managed a sustainable, multi-ethnic system of governance that included a role for a weak central government and diverse regional powers – some tribal, some other – backed by a national Army.” Coll also identifies the rift within the administration over how to “balance the expediency of warlords and ‘security’ versus the imperative of a sustainable Afghan politics.”

John Prandato urges everyone focused on military strategy to also remember that Afghanistan needs “massive investments toward better governance, a healthy economy, adequate security, and perhaps most importantly, a stable and effective education system. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf also calls for a “political surge” in conjunction with the military surge to create a “representative, legitimate government in Afghanistan.” Jennifer Rubin calls President Obama a hypocrite for lauding human rights in the speech while “repeatedly downgrading, diminishing, and discarding human rights and democracy promotion” in his foreign policy. However, Matthew Cooper observes, “what was most compelling was the speech’s tone. Its almost Kissingerian focus on national self-interest and realism. There wasn’t Wilsonian-Bushian flourishes about democracy.”

Finally, for additional reactions to the speech, Marc Ambinder lists the reactions of several key Democrats and Politico offers the reactions of politicians across the political spectrum. Foreign Policy also outlines five strategy options that President Obama ultimately rejected.