Afghanistan: U.S. Softer on Karzai

According to The Washington Post, U.S. officials are  ”abandoning for now their get-tough tactics with [President Hamid] Karzai and attempting to forge a far warmer relationship. They recognize that their initial strategy may have done more harm than good, fueling stress and anger in a beleaguered, conspiracy-minded leader whom the U.S. government needs as a partner.” Now, the U.S. is trying to balance pushing Karzai to undertake necessary reforms while not cornering him into forging alliances with warlords and drug kingpins.

In response, Rich Lowry at National Review Online argues that the administration “went way too far in pressuring, haranguing, and basically alienating” Karzai. He asserts there must be a balance between “holding his hand and pushing him.”  Jennifer Rubin at Commentary agrees, contending “we actually need to bolster the native government if we hope to defeat our mutual enemy.” As does Michael Crowley, who postulates that that Ambassador Holbrooke‘s ”hard-driving style simply wasn’t suited for our Karzai problem.”

For this reason and others, William Kristol and Frederick Kagan argue that the political team in Afghanistan has been “weak [...] ineffective and even counterproductive.” At the same time, Maureen Callahan at The New York Post profiles one former member of that political team, Matthew Hoh, who resigned two months ago because he believes the mission, not American civilians, is counterproductive.

Andrew Sullivan suggests this shift in tone with Karzai ”sets up the U.S. as not just a counter-terrorism, counterinsurgency force, but a long-term partner in building Afghan government and civil society. It suggests out [sic] mission in Afghanistan will be as much or more focued on Afghan governance and political stability as on finding and killing the Taliban.” But Stephen Kinzer in The Guardian warns against imposing Western values upon Afghanistan. He contends, “blinded to cultural differences and wedded to the one-size-fits-all, ‘world is flat’ concept, the West has pushed competitive elections onto Afghanistan [...] Elections, however, have helped rob Afghans of democracy.” In agreement with Kinzer, George Gavrilis in Foreign Affairs cites the example of Tajikistan to argue that “rather than forcing free and fair elections, throwing out warlords, and flooding the country with foreign peacekeepers, the intervening parties [should opt] for a more limited and realistic set of goals.” Both Kinzer and Gavrilis prescribe a return to Afghanistan’s traditional decentralization of government.

Meanwhile, both The New York Times and The Guardian report that Afghan militias under the Community Defense Initiative have begun battling the Taliban across Afghanistan.  This development coincides with the observation by David Ignatius that “the U.S. approach in Afghanistan now is a mix of national and local, government and tribe, top-down and bottom-up.” He argues this mixed approach requires a commitment by the White House that “the fight in Afghanistan is worth the human, economic and political price.” Abe Greenwald at Commentary concurs, arguing the prospects of an “Afghan Awakening” is stymied by the uncertainty over whether the U.S. intends to stay the course.

However, others are not only against a troop increase, but for a troop withdrawal all together. The Congressional Progressive Caucus’ Afghanistan Taskforce has sent a letter to President Obama urging a new course that would: institute a timeline for troop withdrawal, prohibit funding for more troop surges, demand 80% of all U.S. resources be devoted to economic and political development, and more generally prioritize diplomacy and development over the use of force. William Polk goes even further at Informed Comment, arguing for a complete troop withdrawal and the necessity of a loya jirga, or grand assembly of tribes, that will help the Afghans “find their way back to their traditional way of governing themselves.”

Juan Cole asks “where is NATO going to get 400,000 well trained police and troops in a country with a 28% literacy rate? At the moment, 10% of the Afghan National Army is said to be literate.” Furthermore, Cole cites a USA Today article that reports the majority of Bagram’s detainees are mercenaries and not ideologically-driven, putting into question the notion that the Taliban and Al Qaeda are inexorably aligned. Finally, Sam Zarifi of Amnesty International contends ”when the Kabul government seeks accommodations with the very same human rights abusers - the warlords, the drug dealers, the corrupt local officials, and now, increasingly, even the Taliban – who’ve preyed on entire provinces for years, ordinary Afghans are entitled to feel betrayed and view both their government and international forces with a sceptical eye.”